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I am deeply honoured to have been asked to launch such an important and exciting new journal 
as Restorative Justice with this inaugural address. Such new beginnings are a cause for 
celebration, for congratulation, and for taking stock of just how far restorative justice has come 
as a theory and a practice internationally in a relatively short history. Three decades ago, no 
one had even heard of the term ‘restorative justice’ and today we have conferences, books, 
networks and now the journal Restorative Justice. This address is at least partially a reflection 
on this remarkable history. In particular, I want to develop a largely forgotten argument 
originally made by one of the earliest thinkers in restorative justice, Albert Eglash. 
Eglash’s name, if it is known at all, is known primarily because he is credited, in Van Ness and 
Strong’s classic 1997 text Restoring justice and elsewhere, with inventing the term ‘restorative 
justice’ in a series of articles in the 1950s (see Eglash, 1957, 1958b, 1959). Although these 
initial discussions received little attention, a later Eglash contribution to Hudson and Galaway’s 
(1977) Restitution in criminal justice had an early and important influence on a young Howard 
Zehr (as uncovered in Ann Skelton in her history of restorative justice, Skelton, 2005). As a 
result, Albert Eglash’s name has become the answer to a multiple-choice question on countless 
undergraduate criminology examinations. However, his actual writings, even the essays in 
which he first used the term ‘restorative justice’, are much less well known. According to the 
Google Scholar search engine, not one of Eglash’s articles or chapters has been cited over 100 
times, and indeed most have fewer than 15 citations a piece. (By contrast, Zehr’s 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Brendan Marsh for his assistance in the preparation of this article. 
transformational book Changing lenses has been cited over 1,200 times according to the same 
database.) 
With this inaugural address, I hope I can encourage a ‘second look’ at some of Eglash’s 
writings. The basis for my case, incidentally, has little to do with Eglash’s role in the origins 
of restorative justice. Personally, I am not all that concerned about whether Eglash was or was 
not the first to use the term ‘restorative justice’. Origin myths can be dangerous and there is 
good reason to avoid the elevation of ‘founding fathers’, especially as they always seem to be 
of the great, white male variety (see Omale, 2006 for the argument that some academic 
accounts of the history of restorative justice have obscured the African roots of these ideas). 
As many restorative justice advocates are aware, the ideas and principles at the foundation of 
contemporary restorative justice have their roots in ancient societies, numerous world religions, 
and the traditional practices of native or indigenous cultures across the world (see Braithwaite, 
1999; Hadley, 2001; Weitekamp & Kerner, 2002). In fact, even Eglash himself does not make 
any pretence in his own writing to inventing the term. He too acknowledges borrowing the 
concept and gives a full citation in his 1958 article to a German book by the theologians Schrey, 
Walz and Whitehouse (1955). Interestingly, though, the term ‘restorative justice’ does not 
appear in the book itself, which was written in German, but in an English ‘interpretation’ of 
the book written by a Rev. Whitehouse. The actual term that Schrey and colleagues used in 
their German text was ‘heilende Gerechtigkeit’ (which is more properly translated as ‘healing 
justice’). So, in a sense, the coinage of ‘restorative justice’ is almost accidental and certainly 
secondary to the case I want to make in this address. 
My case, instead, is a substantive one. With a few notable exceptions (Daly, 2012; Mirsky, 
2003; Weitekamp, 1999), Eglash’s contributions have been both neglected and possibly 
misunderstood in contemporary debates on restorative justice, and the time may be right, 
precisely because of the successful growth of restorative justice as a concept and practice, to 
revisit some of the ideas he raised half a century ago. There are a few potential explanations as 
to why Eglash’s contributions have been overlooked. First, there is possibly a disciplinary 
issue. Eglash is often referred to in the restorative justice literature as a ‘psychologist’, even 
though his publications are nothing like those of mainstream research psychology (although 
they do resemble those of another great psychological essayist of the era, Hans Toch). To many 
sociologists and criminologists, such a designation may be reason alone to ignore a body of 
work (I speak here as someone who has himself been the recipient of the dreaded label of 
‘psychologist’ so I know of what I speak). Second, Eglash was neither a prolific nor a 
particularly eloquent theoretician. Although highly creative and (I think) persuasive, his writing 
is full of anecdotes and rather light on scholarship (Eglash, 1959 is something of an exception 
to both of these charges). Like Toch, Eglash was interested in generating ideas with impact on 
practice on the ground, and in that regard the history of restorative justice over the past three 
decades is a rather stunning testament to the value of the anecdote in the development of 
practice. 
Yet, the real reason Eglash’s research has been neglected has to do with a more substantive 
issue, identified by Daly (2012) and others. At the very end of his most widely known and 
recent contribution, the 1977 article that inspired Zehr and who knows how many others in 
restorative justice work, Eglash does an unusual about-face. After spending the entire essay 
setting up a classic ‘third way’ argument for the potential of restorative justice as an alternative 
to either punishment or rehabilitation models, Eglash decides that his vision of restorative 
justice—like those other two visions of justice—remains offender-centred and could not be 
considered to be genuinely victim-centred: 
 
I now want to admit that I too am offender oriented … I have never visited any victims, 
never interviewed any, never wondered what questions I would want to ask, never 
thought to include any victim interviews … in this paper. For me, restorative justice … 
like its two alternatives, punishment and treatment, is concerned primarily with 
offenders. Any benefit to victims is a bonus, gravy, but not the meat and potatoes of 
the process. (Eglash, 1977: 99) 
 
Such an unusually blunt confession simply does not correspond well with contemporary 
thinking around restorative justice, and indeed has not been borne out in the empirical evidence 
either. As Robinson and Shapland (2008) have argued, the research evidence is rather more 
convincing in terms of the benefits of restorative justice for victim satisfaction than it is as an 
offender rehabilitation strategy. Worse, Eglash is true to his word. Almost all of his essays 
from the 1950s are oriented around the reintegration of the offender and not supporting victims. 
As such, Daly’s (2012) argument that, although Eglash planted a seed, he never fully realised 
the full potential of restorative justice for transforming practice, is understandable. Even 
Eglash, reflecting back on his work from the vantage point of 2003, recognised that the 
contemporary restorative justice movement has ‘moved my concept in a very constructive 
direction, far beyond what I had conceived’ (Mirsky, 2003: 1). 
However, I want to argue that there is merit in returning, at least for the sake of argument, to 
Eglash’s original conception, as some of his vision has been lost in contemporary restorative 
justice thinking and, in particular, implementation. Not only was Eglash ‘ahead of his time’ in 
terms of theory—with many of the ideas that he articulated in the 1950s and 1960s increasing 
in popularity in the last decade—but there is actually a growing empirical case around some of 
the claims Eglash was making as well. My argument is that by reclaiming Eglash for restorative 
justice, we could, as a movement, take credit or partner with some of the most interesting 
developments in criminal justice today. 
 
Re-introducing Albert Eglash 
Biographical information about Albert Eglash’s background can be found in Mirsky (2003), 
Zieger (2003), and in some of his published articles (see e.g. Eglash, 1958a, 1958c). Eglash 
taught at Wisconsin State College at LaCross, but he clearly devoted an equal amount of time 
to community pursuits as he did to academic ones. In the 1950s, he got involved with something 
called the Mayor’s Rehabilitation Committee on Skid Row Problems in Detroit, as well as 
something called The Commission on Children and Youth. Through these activities, he says, 
he became impressed with the 12-step principles of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) (see Kurtz, 
1979), and this exposure helped him become a pioneer in the use of group therapy dynamics in 
the practice of probation and community corrections.  
Today, the vast majority of probation work is done in groups, for purposes of efficiency and 
economy of scale at the very least. However, at the time Eglash was working, probation work 
was based almost entirely on a one-to-one casework model (Vanstone, 2004). Eglash 
developed a number of programmes for those in trouble with the law based on 12-step 
principles. The first was a group for adolescents convicted for delinquency that became known 
as ‘Youth Anonymous’ (Eglash, 1958c). This was followed by a mutual aid group for adult 
probationers that became known as ‘Adults Anonymous’ (Eglash, 1958a). These groups were 
based on both the narrative testimonial work for which AA is famous (‘My name is X, and I 
am an alcoholic …’) as well as the core helping principle that is at the heart of the 12-step 
model: that each member stays sober by helping others in the group stay sober (O’Reilly, 1997). 
The application of these ideas to people convicted of crimes was, at the time, hugely innovative 
and very much ahead of its time. Indeed, Eglash’s work was a subject of criminological 
research before Eglash was writing his own articles. Chester Poremba was writing about 
Eglash’s innovations in ‘group probation’ in the journal Federal Probation back in 1955. 
Importantly, it was through this 12-step based group work that Eglash first describes the idea 
of what he calls ‘restorative justice’ and, synonymously, ‘creative restitution’. In a series of 
articles (Eglash, 1958b, 1959, 1977), he contrasts this new idea of creative restitution with 
ordinary notions of restitution which he characterises as follows: 
 
a) It is a financial obligation 
b) Its extent is limited 
c) It is court-determined 
d) It is an individual act. 
 
On the other hand, according to Eglash’s formulation, creative or restorative restitution could 
be differentiated by the following characteristics: 
 
1. It is any constructive act 
Eglash (1957: 619) writes: ‘While punishment must be painful or uncomfortable, it need not 
be a constructive contribution. The essence of restitution, on the other hand, is a constructive 
effort, an offender giving something of himself.’ Eglash notes that restorative acts have a 
‘poetic justice’ about them; they should produce visible ‘good’ with tangible beneficiaries in 
the same way that one’s crimes involve clear harms with real victims. 
 
2. It is creative and unlimited 
Eglash (1957: 620) describes justice as ‘the first mile’, whereas restorative justice, he argues, 
is explicitly about ‘going the second mile’:  
 The first mile is punishment, or reparations or indemnity or atonement. But the offender 
has not yet squared or redeemed the situation, making it good. Only a second mile is 
restitution in its broad meaning of a complete restoration of good will and harmony. 
 
The primary example Eglash gives of this second mile is for individuals who have done 
something wrong to help turn around others at risk of ending up in prison themselves.  
 
3. It is guided, self-determined behaviour 
Eglash (1957: 620) writes: ‘In punishment, a judge makes a decision and this decision is 
imposed on an offender … If the same technique is used in restitution, then restitution is no 
longer a creative act. Some of its growth value is lost.’  
 
4. It can have a group basis 
Eglash (1957: 621) writes: ‘In punishment, a man stands alone. But restitution is a creative act, 
and the way is open for group discussion.’  
This is a fairly simple formula, but the implications are of course immense2—especially since 
most of the ideas above have now been thoroughly integrated into mainstream restorative 
justice thinking. Eglash, for instance, was far ahead of his time with regard to his insights into 
criminology’s great intellectual struggle, the bedevilling issue of agency versus social 
determination: 
 
                                                 
2 In fact, most recently, in his 2003 interview with Mirsky, Eglash described his interests in applying these 
principles to the resolution of armed conflict—a move from the criminological conflict resolution to macro-level 
peace-making that has been followed by many a restorative justice advocate from Braithwaite (2011) to McEvoy 
(2003). 
Both punishment and treatment … are committed to a specific position regarding ‘free 
will’ versus ‘psychological determinism’ … For example, jurists and theologians … 
are likely to agree that we are responsible for our behaviour, and as a consequence, we 
should be punished … for our wilful disobedience … Similarly, behavioural and 
clinical scientists … are likely to agree that our developmental history and our 
metabolic and neurological condition … were determinants of that offence and that … 
we should not be punished, but helped. (Eglash, 1977: 92) 
 
Eglash says that as a third way, restorative justice can solve this problem by separating the 
issue of blame for the past from responsibility for the future: 
 
A restorative approach of creative restitution accepts both free will and psychological 
determinism. It redefines past responsibility in terms of damage or harm done, and can 
therefore accept psychological determinism for our past behaviour without destroying 
the concept of our being responsible for what we have done. Similarly, it redefines 
present responsibility in terms of our ability or capacity for constructive remedial action 
and can therefore accept free will for our present. (1977: 92) 
 
In other words, years before the highly influential work of Braithwaite and Braithwaite 
(2001) or the legal philosophers Nicola Lacey and Hannah Pickard (2013), Eglash was 
advocating a sophisticated, restorative vision for separating blame for past harms from 
responsibility for ‘making good’ in the future. In what I have called a ‘compensatory script’ 
(Maruna, 2001, following Brickman et al., 1981), Eglash basically argues that ‘You may not 
be responsible for being down, but you are responsible for getting up’ (1977: 92). In this 
argument, one can clearly see the beginnings of what Lacey and Pickard (2013) are describing 
as ‘responsibility without blame’—a transformative idea that has broken new ground in 
philosophy, and the origins can be traced back to Eglash’s humble essay. 
 
Restorative justice’s debt to Alcoholics Anonymous 
Where did Eglash get this deep, rich insight in 1955? Here Eglash is very clear: he borrowed it 
from Alcoholics Anonymous:3 
 
For instance, in AA, alcoholics insist, ‘I’m not responsible for my past behaviour, much 
of its most destructive moments occurring in blackout when I was certainly far from 
sane. Still, I accept present responsibility to make amends to those I inadvertently hurt, 
and to help other victims of alcoholism’. (Eglash, 1977: 92) 
 
Indeed, Eglash is explicit in almost all of his writings regarding the debt his conception of 
restorative justice owes to the 12-step model of Alcoholics Anonymous. In particular, he links 
his idea of creative restitution to Steps 8 and 9 about making an inventory of the people one 
has harmed and making amends to them, and Step 10 about confessing to one’s mistakes. 
This aspect of restorative justice’s origin story is rarely acknowledged or explored, yet the 
potential for better understanding the dynamics of restorative practice is immense. First, 
anyone involved in criminal justice work of any kind recognises quickly that there is an 
enormous overlap between the social study of what we call ‘addiction’ and ‘substance abuse’ 
and the world we call ‘crime’ and ‘offending’. Certainly, there are those who offend who have 
never used addictive substances seriously, and there are those who regularly use addictive 
substances seriously who never seriously offend. However, for the most part at least when we 
are talking about habitual, repeat offending (the kind of offending that is of most interest to the 
criminal justice system), there is no distinction between this imaginary person we call ‘the 
addict’ and the equally imaginary (and offensive) notion of ‘the offender’. If a justice policy 
aims to be ‘restorative’ in some way in the lives of such individuals, it presumably needs to be 
aware of both the science of addiction and the process of recovery.  
Second, the 12-step literature has grown dramatically since the 1950s when Eglash borrowed 
his ideas for creative restitution. Restorative justice theory development would benefit 
enormously from the remarkable philosophical and psychological contributions by Kurtz 
                                                 
3 Interestingly, Lacey and Pickard (2013) are also clear that they have adopted their philosophical concept of 
‘responsibility without blame’ from the field of addiction and mental health treatment and recovery, where Pickard 
was a practitioner as well (see e.g. Pickard & Pearce, 2013). 
(1979), Vaillant (2005), McCrady & Miller (1993), Denzin (1987), Bateson (1971), and 
especially William L. White (1998, 2000, 2007), not to mention the deep intellectual 
foundations of Alcoholics Anonymous in the work of Carl Jung4 (see Jung, 1976) and William 
James (1902). This theoretical and research base is thick precisely where the restorative justice 
evidence base is thin: around the process and understanding of personal transformation and 
redemption. 
A parallel case has recently been developed by Victoria Pynchon (2005) in a fascinating 
analysis in the Pepperdine Law Review. Although Pynchon does not mention Eglash or his 
connections to both schools of thought, she also argues that restorative justice has much to 
learn from the Alcoholics Anonymous model. Although restorative justice has struggled with 
the issue of shame, seeking to strike the correct balance of reintegrative shaming, but finding 
that conferencing can become its own form of stigmatising, she writes: 
 
There is, however, a solution with proven effectiveness. For the past sixty years, the 
program of Alcoholics Anonymous has been achieving moral education and 
community reconciliation using the ‘right’ kind of shame—which in this author’s 
opinion means no shame at all. (2005: 11) 
 
Even Thomas Scheff (1997), who has contributed so much to restorative thought with his 
microsociological theory of emotions, has argued that Alcoholics Anonymous is ‘the one 
institution in our society that recognizes shame’ (see also Kurtz, 1981). 
Perhaps the most important idea that Eglash developed from Alcoholics Anonymous, and 
which requires further consideration in contemporary restorative justice thought, is the idea 
first developed in Jung’s ‘Fundamental Questions of Psychotherapy’ of the ‘wounded healer’ 
(see especially Frank, 1995).  
 
                                                 
4 These roots are very subtly hinted at by Eglash. In various articles, he channels Melanie Klein with his nods to 
analysts’ use of ‘loss and restitution’, mentions of the book I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, and occasional 
references to psychoanalytic theory and the power of ritual dynamics in the change process (see especially Eglash, 
1959). 
Without too much exaggeration … a good half of every treatment that probes at all, 
deeply consists in the doctor examining himself, for only what he can put right in 
himself can he hope to put right in the patient … it is his own hurt that gives the measure 
of his power to heal. This, and nothing else, is the meaning of the Greek myth of the 
‘wounded physician’. (Jung, 1951: 116) 
 
In their 12-step model, Alcoholics Anonymous employs this insight by arguing that no 
one is better placed to help a person recover than a recovering person, and also nothing helps 
a recovering person recover more than helping others with their recovery (O’Reilly, 1997). 
These ‘wounded healers’ have been at the heart of the success of 12-step recovery from its 
origins (White, 2000). 
Likewise, Eglash openly acknowledges the contributions of a wounded healer friend of his 
named ‘Tip’, a Detroit gang member who discovered AA during a ten-year stretch in prison, 
in helping him develop his ideas around restorative justice. Eglash writes: 
 
Our greatest resource, largely untouched, to aid in the rehabilitation of offenders is 
other offenders. Just how this resource is to be effectively tapped as a constructive 
power is a matter for exploration. Perhaps Alcoholics Anonymous provides some clues. 
(Eglash, 1958–1959a: 239). 
 
Eglash explains this value by arguing, ‘Perhaps an offender is an effective person for getting 
through the defences and resistances of another offender’ (Eglash, 1958: 238). He cites Folsom 
Prison’s Associate Warden Bill Lawson as explaining the reason he too utilises parolee 
‘wounded healers’ in correctional work: ‘The parolees tell the men the same things we’ve been 
telling them for months. But the difference is that the inmates listen’ (Eglash, 1958: 237). 
Eglash acknowledges that the benefits of wounded healing go ‘both ways’, however, and 
indeed might be even more important for the helper than the help-recipient. ‘A mutual-help 
principle effectively leads troubled persons on the road from stigma (to be set apart, as marked 
or branded) to dedication (to be set apart, for special service).’ Indeed, rigorous studies of 
mutual-help groups, 40 years hence, have found that engaging in helping activities is related to 
better psychosocial adjustment and treatment outcomes (Crape et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 1999; 
Zemore et al., 2004), and higher self-esteem and feelings of self-worth (Hutchinson et al., 2006; 
Maton, 1988; Schiff & Bargal, 2000; for reviews of the benefits of ex-prisoner mutual aid 
efforts, see LeBel, 2007, 2009). 
 
Eglash 2014 
A contemporary revisitation of Eglash’s work raises numerous questions and issues for me as 
a researcher in the now firmly established and thriving field of restorative justice. In 1977, 
before hardly anyone knew what the term even meant, Eglash asked, ‘How do offenders 
themselves, those on probation or parole, those in prison or juvenile institutions, feel about the 
concept of restorative justice?’ (Eglash, 1977: 98). Thirty years later, I am not sure that we 
know the answer to this question. We have far better evidence of the impact of restorative 
practices on recidivism outcomes than we have ever had, and we know a great deal about 
participant satisfaction levels compared to those who attend traditional courtroom processes. 
However, are we really utilising the ‘greatest resource’ at our disposal to the fullest extent?  
We expect an enormous amount of the individuals we sometimes call ‘offenders’ in restorative 
justice, although we are fully aware of all of the social, economic and structural disadvantages 
they face, not least their treatment by the criminal justice system. Eglash was fully aware of 
this deep wound that exists at the core of the so-called ‘offender’: 
 
So much has happened to the person to weaken or destroy that sense of worth. In the 
beginning perhaps, a rejecting parent; then problems in school that added to feelings of 
inferiority; then failures in jobs, discord in marriage, or a variety of other sources of 
trouble. … and now to have been arrested, jailed, tried and found guilty seems to say 
to the defendant all over again, in the most concrete ways, that he is an inferior object 
with no right to look at himself with pride or hope. (Eglash & Keve, 1957: 4)5 
                                                 
5 Incidentally, Eglash’s co-author of that piece was a county director of community corrections who went on to 
much higher offices within Wisconsin’s state system. One wonders how many voices today, within state systems 
of criminal justice, would be so open about these hard truths of stigmatisation and labelling within the criminal 
 It is remarkable, therefore, that we expect genuine remorse and contrition, heartfelt 
apologies and restitution, from such individuals. It is even more remarkable that we think that 
we can achieve this through a process of shaming when the individual (usually a young person) 
is confronted by victims, family members (usually parents or grandparents), community elders, 
trained mediators, and often representatives of the criminal justice system (uniformed police 
officers in many cases). From a ritual perspective (see especially Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994; 
Rossner, 2011), such a dynamic seems unlikely. The figure of ‘the victim’, of course, inhabits 
a moral high ground like few others in society, so he or she is immediately set apart, and 
explicitly meant to leave a conference with no blame attached to him or her for the outcome. 
Parents and guardians, likewise, fill a stereotypical role as moral authority figures. Worst of 
all, the professional mediator, although unbiased and trained to support and give voice to all 
participants in the conference, is also likely to give little or nothing of her or himself away. 
Personally, the mediator (like all of the participants) may be swimming in shame, may have 
just gone through a humiliating divorce or be recovering from food addiction or a third bout of 
depression, but none of this is likely to find its way into the restorative conference. As a result, 
as far as the individual in the ‘offender’ role is aware, he or she is (once again!) in the position 
of having all blame heaped upon them, scapegoat-like, as the only person in the room who 
needs to apologise. Forty years ago, Eglash suggested that the young people in trouble with the 
law he spoke to found the idea of such penitence to be ludicrous. It is not hard to imagine why. 
All of us would seek to protect our egos and sense of self-worth in the face of such an organised 
assault.  
Eglash’s work might suggest that the dynamic would be different if some of the people in that 
circle were wounded—or at least more open about their wounds.6 ‘Only a skilful guide can 
encourage a [person] to go a second mile. I suspect that the best guide is a [person] who has 
him [or herself] gone through it’ (Eglash, 1958: 621). Perhaps we need to open our circles up. 
Would we see more contrition and more genuine restitution if some of the people in the circle 
could talk about times they themselves had let their families down, humiliated their mothers, 
stolen from their grandparents to purchase drugs they could not afford through shoplifting?  
                                                 
justice system (see LeBel, 2012). 
6 This may happen in some, but certainly not all restorative conferences at the moment. Certainly one example of 
this sharing of vulnerabilities in practice can be found in the peacemaking circles that have emerged from the 
restorative tradition (see e.g. Pranis, Stuart & Wedge, 2003).  
Almost all of us have bullied others in our lives. Yet only a few have ever been caught for it 
and made to account for themselves formally. What if, when confronting a young person 
accused of bullying in a restorative circle, mediators and parents were to talk openly about 
times they had bullied vulnerable others in their lives? How they wished they had been 
punished for it or felt shocked and betrayed when they were? Even better, perhaps, they might 
talk about how much they wish they had the opportunity to find that individual, from all those 
years ago, and apologise. I know this is what I would say if I were in that circle. Then again, I 
would also want to admit how petrified I would be to actually do so in real life, to pick up that 
phone and have that conversation. What a daunting, awful, but potentially incredible process it 
would be.  
Rather than lecturing young people about the dangers of delinquency, as they do in some 
jurisdictions, perhaps police officers in restorative circles could also be open about their own 
behaviours. Surely, even cops have been involved in bullying, in lying, cheating and hurting 
others. Surely they too have much to apologise for as we all do. Exposing such things in a 
public forum requires a lot of honesty and bravery of course, but then we are expecting no less 
of the people we call ‘offenders’. Eglash might say that bringing that dynamic into the circle is 
the key to generating real restitution and genuine remorse from young people.  
The easiest way to ensure these dynamics though, of course, is to draw on the resource of fellow 
ex-prisoners in our restorative work, as Eglash argued. Certainly, the value that such 
individuals can bring not just to rehabilitative work but at a strategic policy level has been 
widely recognised in recent years. In the United Kingdom, ex-prisoner led and facilitated 
campaigning organisations like User Voice and UNLOCK have made extraordinary strides in 
the past five years (see especially Weaver, 2011). Even the Conservative-led coalition 
government in the UK has situated ‘old lags’—that is, reformed former prisoners—at the centre 
of their recent plans for a transformation of rehabilitation. The Conservative Justice Secretary 
Chris Grayling recently said he would like ex-prisoners, including former gang members, to 
meet newly released inmates at the prison gates, acting as mentors, ‘making good use of old 
lags in stopping the new ones’ (Travis, 2012). Cynically, this ‘old lag’ rhetoric appears to be a 
partial cover-up for a real agenda around privatisation, union busting, and the de-
professionalisation of probation work in the UK (see Teague, 2013), yet at some level the 
Conservatives appear to be giving in to a powerful argument and a growing international trend 
in this regard.  
After all, the same pattern can be found in New York City with its Justice Reinvestment efforts 
(see Tucker & Cadora, 2003), in Chicago with the Violence Interrupters (see Skogan et al., 
2009), and elsewhere where ex-prisoners are being seen as crucial resources for peace-making 
rather than burdens on their communities (see Dwyer & Maruna, 2011; LeBel, 2009). 
Organisations like The Center for NuLeadership on Urban Solutions, All of Us or None, and 
the Women’s Prison Association (WPA) in the United States seek to develop ‘a group of 
leaders equipped to craft solutions to the problems facing incarcerated and formerly 
incarcerated persons’.7 These grassroots organisations provide a voice to formerly incarcerated 
persons and give them the opportunity to engage in attempts to change public policy.8 For 
example, All of Us or None is a national organising initiative of formerly incarcerated persons 
and persons in prison. On its website and in its brochure, this organisation states that 
‘Advocates have spoken for us, but now is the time for us to speak for ourselves. We clearly 
have the ability to be more than the helpless victims of the system’.9  
In academia, a similar movement called ‘Convict Criminology’, largely consisting of ex-
prisoner academics, have made important strides in changing the way in which crime and 
justice are taught and studied at the university level (see Weaver, 2011, 2014). One of the most 
interesting and important groups of convict criminologists to emerge in recent years is known 
as LIFERS, Inc., a prisoner-led group of men serving life terms at the State Correctional 
Institution at Graterford in Pennsylvania. In a recent article in The Prison Journal, the LIFERS, 
Inc. steering group (2004: 52) provide what might be the perfect encapsulation of the strengths-
based idea: 
 
Accepting the possibility that we could very well be destined to die in prison, we looked 
at how a life of meaning could be created given our circumstances … As men of 
conscience, with nothing to lose or gain personally, we felt a human responsibility to 
do what we could to attack this problem … LIFERS, Inc. reached the conclusion that 
                                                 
7 see www.wpaonline.org/institute/wap.htm. 
8 McEvoy and Shirlow (2009) provide a fascinating case study of leadership and activism among ex-prisoners in 
the transitional context of Northern Irish society, where former prisoners have played an instrumental role in the 
peace process at every level of government. Although there are of course differences between these ex-prisoners 
(who experienced a form of political imprisonment during the armed conflict in Northern Ireland) and non-
political ex-prisoners, McEvoy and Shirlow point out that there are significant potential lessons for former gang 
members and other alliances of ex-prisoner groups in the experiences of released prisoners in Northern Ireland. 
9 www.allofusornone.org/about.html. 
we, from our unique position as former perpetrators, could offer the leadership 
necessary to prevent street crime and violence, saving lives in the process. 
 
The LIFERS, Inc (2004: 60) statement mirrors Eglash’s argument from half a century earlier 
about giving back to their communities as being a crucial ‘second mile’ in offenders’ work to 
reduce crime: ‘It is not enough that offenders released from the Department of Corrections go 
on their way to live a successful life (the expectation of the rehabilitation model); they should 
be expected to produce positive tangible results that improve life in the communities they 
earlier destroyed.’ Like Eglash, the LIFERS also advocate a mutual help perspective whereby 
prisoners and former prisoners are utilised as guides in the transformational process of others: 
‘Transformed offenders have legitimacy among their pretransformed peers that established 
social workers, prison officials, and law enforcement personnel do not have’ (LIFERS, 2004: 
63). As a result, ‘the transformation process that begins with the self ends with the 
transformation of others’ (p. 64). 
Similar work is going on across the world. None of this activity is organised. It is not a formal 
social movement. It does not even have a name, but—following Albert Eglash—I call it 
‘Restorative Justice’. 
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